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Abstract: British India was characterized by wide regional disparities in the provision of 
health-related services. This late-19th century regional inequality has been under-
researched, despite health being a fundamental dimension of human and economic 
development. This paper relies on qualitative and quantitative research to show that 
land-related institutions, such as the land revenue system or the type of settlement, 
influenced health expenditure at the local level. The importance of geographical factors 
such as the rainfall should be considered, and relevant provincial differences in hospital 
and dispensaries expenditure have been found. Finally, the origins of each institution, 
as well as the mechanisms through which they influenced the supply of health services, 
are considered. 
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The role of institutions in the economic development and the provision of public goods 
in different regions, countries and continents has been a mainstream topic for at least 
the last two decades. In this regard, the appearance of Neo Institutionalism, brought by 
Douglass North and its critiques, from which Chang, H. J. (2011) could be one of the most 
prominent examples, has cleared the path for the introduction of the institutional 
variables in the economic history debates. Overall, the use of institutions explaining the 
economic performance and the public goods provision of different regions has become 
extremely popular in the academia. In this regard, North, D.C. (1991: 109) assured that 
the mere economic evolution was not sufficient to explain economic growth since 
proper institutions appear to be necessary for such outcome.  
The way institutional variables have been introduced varies among different authors: 
Acemoglu, D., et al (2001) and Nunn, N. (2008) study the effect of institutions with a 
very long run perspective and with an extensive use of econometric tools, while other 
authors have a more short run historical and dialectic approach (like Chaudhary, L. 
(2010a)). Overall, the long run approach has been extensively criticised. Among those 
critiques, Austin, G. (2008) presents a large set of issues that may appear in those studies 
(the quality of the evidences, the compression of history, the binary relation between 
economic development and rent seeking and the importance of the natives’ agency2). 
There has been a third vision in all this literature which is developed by Sokoloff, K. L., & 
Engerman, S. L. (2000), who try to argue that the factor endowments of each 
geographical area explain the introduction of certain institutions and that explains the 
economic and public goods results in those regions. 
Within this literature and line of research, one of the topics that has been debated is the 
development and public goods provision differences in India – particularly concerning 
the colonial period. Two main theories have emerged from this debate: One is presented 
                                                          
2 The quality of the evidences is criticised by Austin, G. (2008: 998) since long run estimations used in 
some studies appear to be almost arbitrary. The compression of history is a critique more to the core long 
run analysis on institutions since Austin considers that a lot of historical events between the institutional 
variable (say, for instance, the Atlantic slavery trade) and the economic results from which a correlation 
is searched. Finally, Austin denies the dichotomy established in some articles between rent seeking 
behaviour and economic development and reassesses the importance of the native agency in the 
institutional and economic results in areas colonized by the Europeans. 
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by Roy, T. (2014: 346), who outlines the influence of geographical factors in the fiscal 
capacity of each region as well as in the public goods provision for the late nineteenth 
century. Similarly, Roy, T. (2006: 171) considers that resource endowments played an 
important role in regional differentiation at least during the colonial rule and later. A 
different explicative framework is presented by Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005: 29) who 
argue that the land revenue system (institution) explains the differences in agricultural 
investment, especially after the Green Revolution, leading to modern differences in 
economic development and public goods provision between regions of India. Kapur, S., 
& Kim, S. (2006: 22) expand the argument defending that divergences in agricultural 
productivity already existed during the colonial rule. Finally, Chaudhary, L. (2010a) finds 
significant differences between provinces in the public spending on education for the 
early 20th Century, which apparently could have derived from the differences in the land 
revenue system and type of settlement of each area. 
Even considering institutions as the main explanation to the regional differences on 
public goods provision, their origin has also drawn the attention of scholars. It is not 
clear to which extent certain institutions (like the caste system or the land revenue 
systems) were implemented by the British or already existed (Stokes, E. (1980: 40)). In 
that sense, the British dominion over India, and its development, has prompt a lot of 
research regarding its role in the legal and social fields. In other words, sociologists, 
historians and anthropologist have studied the role of the British in the creation of 
informal and formal institutions. Washbrook, D. (2004: 481) stands out for its general 
overview of the social effects of the British dominion over South India, defending that 
the British rule had some effects on the native institutions of India, but it did not explain 
the evolution of all of them. Nonetheless, as the previously mentioned author 
underlines, more radical positions have been established in this debate: On the one 
hand, some authors present the idea that the British were completely unable to 
introduce any significant change in the Indian society. Among those authors, 
Frykenberg, R. E. (1977) can be considered as the most prominent, as Washbrook, D. 
(2004: 479) and Stokes, E. (1980: 31) signal. On the other hand, Washbrook presents 
Parthasarathi, P. (2001) as the other side of the coin, arguing that the British rule 
dramatically transformed the Indian society.  
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Within this research framework, this work aims to identify the explicative power of 
institutions (the land revenue system, the type of settlement and the caste system) in 
India’s regional differences regarding public goods provision during the colonial period 
(more precisely, regarding public health expenditure). This is expected to be done 
controlling for some other relevant aspects mentioned in the literature (see Section III). 
The analysis is not bounded into a Neo Institutional framework where property rights 
explain the levels of agricultural investment and future economic development (Kapur, 
S., & Kim, S. (2006)). Instead, it attempts to emphasise the role of public revenue and 
social organization in the provision of public health, which essentially consists of public 
rather than private investment. In this regard, the revenue collected by public 
administrations could be dependent on the land revenue system and the type of 
settlement, which somehow could explain the public health provision in the different 
regions. Also, the politic stability and limited differences in policy preferences generated 
by social fragmentation and stratification (which could be derived from caste 
fragmentation differences), as Chaudhary, L. (2006) and Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997) 
signal, could explain the differences in the public goods provision. Surprisingly, this 
institutional approach specifically focused on the provision of public health in colonial 
India has not been deeply explored yet. As for the influence of British colonialism and 
ancient Indian traditions in the caste and land revenue system institutions, it is aimed to 
define this influence3 and to briefly present how the effect of those institutions on the 
provision of public goods (in this case, of public health) could potentially provide some 
clues regarding the origins and influences of each institution. 
The methodology used is composed of two different approaches: The first one is a 
descriptive analysis which attempts to study the previous literature, describe the 
evolution of public health in India and the reasoning behind the potential importance of 
institutions in the public goods provision differences. The second one is an econometric 
study to complement and quantitatively back up the previous analysis. The descriptive 
analysis is focused mainly on the British Crown rule over India, although previous periods 
are also mentioned, especially regarding the study of the influence of ancient traditions 
in institutions. On the other hand, the econometric study uses data from the middle 
                                                          
3 From a revision of the already existing literature. 
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years of the British Crown rule (1901 – 1904). The reasons behind the choice of this 
period of study are various: Among them the availability of the data, the relevance of 
decentralization reforms (which were done during the second half of the 19th Century) 
and the famines suffered in the subcontinent (that generally ended at the turn of the 
century4).  
The present study generally uses as its unit of analysis the districts of British India due 
to the importance of those in the public health expenditure after the decentralization 
reforms commented in Section II. Furthermore, the use of districts as the unit of study 
allows for a larger number of observations in the statistical analysis and the 
decentralization processes permit the study of a revenue source that supplied the 
district boards directly: The cesses. 
The conclusions presented in this document are conditioned by the biases introduced 
by the data used (see Section IV). Having said that, the present work shows two formal 
institutions (the land revenue system and the type of settlement) as two important 
explanatory factors of the pattern of public health expenditure (provision) while 
geographical and other factors’ explanatory power seem to be of less importance (but 
not null). As for the influence of British and ancient traditions in the different 
institutions, it can be said that apparently, neither the caste system nor the land revenue 
system appeared to be completely influenced by either. Moreover, the effect of each 
institution on the public goods provision (in this particular case, the public health 
expenditure) might be interpreted as an initial approximation to the influence of ancient 
traditions and the British colonial rule in each institution. Hence, the caste system, 
whose fragmentation apparently had no influence in the public health expenditure, 
might not have that influence due to the relatively recent5 and potentially important 
influence exercised by the British in this institution. 
The present work is organized as follows: In Section II it is discussed the administrative 
organization of the Raj, a general overview of the public health evolution during the 
British rule is made and the decentralization reforms of the late 19th Century are 
                                                          
4 According to Davis, M (2002: 299) the worst famines that the subcontinent ever suffered went from 
1875 to 1900. 
5 As will be stated later in this work, this British influence might be dated from the Indian mutiny of 1857. 
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presented. Section III is devoted to the discussion on the historical origins and the 
potential mechanisms by which the land revenue system, the type of settlement, the 
caste system and other factors could have influenced the provision of public health in 
different districts. Section IV defines the data used and its potential biases and Section 
V describe and present the results of the econometric study. Finally, in sections VI and 
VII the results are discussed and some preliminary conclusions are highlighted. 
 
II. Public health, finance and local governance in British India 
The administration of the Raj at the end of the 19th Century differed dramatically from 
the administration inherited from the British East India Company (from now on, the 
Company). There were mainly 3 administrative levels, as is presented in Figure 2.1: The 
central government, the provincial governments and the district boards or 
municipalities.  
Figure 2.1. Administrative levels in the British Raj at the end of the 19th Century. 
Source: Own elaboration and Meyer, W.S. et al (1909a). 
The municipalities were formed by a group of municipal commissioners as is pointed out 
in Meyer, W.S. et al (1909a: 288-289). The provision of public services by the 
municipalities was classified as obligatory or discretional within the Government of 
Bombay (1901: 52), although this classification was applicable to the whole of India 
according to Meyer, W.S. et al (1909a: 290). Among the functions classified as 
obligatory, there were sanitary functions (watering, cleansing of public streets, the 
maintenance of hospitals and public vaccinations among others) as well as the 
establishment of police and the maintenance of primary education. 
As is signalled in Chaudhary, L. & Garg, M. (2015: 940) the majority of the population at 
the turn of the century lived in rural areas (almost 90% of the population). Hence, 
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following Lord Ripon’s reform of 1881-826, a new system of boards was extended 
through British India creating the local and district boards. Those institutions had similar 
functions to those assigned to the municipalities (including the maintenance of hospitals 
and dispensaries) and were created in rural areas (Meyer, W.S. et al (1909a: 301-302)). 
The district boards, were to the local boards, what the central government was to the 
provincial governments according to Meyer, W.S. et al (1909a: 302).  
Having said that, local governance (hence, the establishment of municipalities, district 
boards and responsibilities as well as revenue sources for them) in British India was a 
matter that was not tackled until the crown assumed the direct control over the 
territory7. In this regard, it was not until the administration of Lord Mayo8 that some 
effort was done in order to introduce an effective government at the provincial level. 
Previously to the reform by Mayo, the provincial governments had absolutely no control 
over their incomes, as is signalled in Meyer, W.S. et al (1909a: 164)9 “The local 
governments [provincial governments] had possessed, hitherto, practically no control 
over their own revenues, and the grants for the services in each Province were made 
annually by the Supreme [central] Government.” However, in the year 1870-71, the 
administration of Lord Mayo introduced a new method for the financing of the provincial 
administrations that consisted on a fixed grant that the provincial government received 
from the central government, called provincial settlement. That change allowed the 
provincial governments to manage some services at their own expenses. Hence, the 
reform of Lord Mayo increased the sources of revenue for the provincial governments 
and stated the basis for further decentralization in the Raj. Later on, in 1877, the land 
revenue among other revenue sources were entrusted to the provincial governments 
(Patil, S. H. (1995: 40)) who had the responsibility to collect them. 
Following Lord Mayo’s reform, the appointment in 1880 of Lord Ripon as the Viceroy of 
India lead to another reform that dug more deeply into the finance and autonomy of 
local administrations. Firstly, the reform was presented with the objective to educate10 
                                                          
6 Reforms will be commented later in this section. 
7 After the Mutiny of 1857. 
8 Lord Mayo was the Viceroy of India from 1869 until its assassination in 1872.  
9 Meyer, W.S. et al (1909a). 
10 Hence, it might be considered that the British believed that the natives needed to somehow learn how 
to rule themselves and administrate public resources. 
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the Indian population on the government of public institutions and increase the 
assistance of Indian natives in the administration of the Raj (Vajpeyi, D. K., & Arnold, J. 
M. (2003: 35)). Secondly, the reform of 1882 (generally known as Ripon’s Report) 
allowed for a greater finance of local administrations (including district boards) through 
the management of the rates of local taxes (cesses) of the municipal councils, district 
and local boards (Weinstein, B. (2018: 7)). Thirdly, provincial governments started 
receiving a share of their land revenue (Chaudhary, L. (2010a: 191)) and finally, 
according to Chaudhary, L. (2010b: 281), this reform decentralized, at the district/local 
boards level the management of public health, among other public services, in rural 
areas11. Nonetheless, health expenditure in rural areas was not exclusively done at the 
district board level: Provincial governments, the central government and certain private 
entities also financed the health system of the Raj. However, according to Chand, G. 
(1947: 230) from the 5,650 hospitals present in the country, 4,195 were financed by local 
bodies (district boards and municipalities) by 1939. This leads to the idea that the district 
boards and municipalities were the principal contributors to the public health system of 
the Raj. Overall, the main consequence of Lord Ripon’s reform was an increase of the 
district boards and municipalities revenues and a certain decentralization of 
expenditures such as health and primary education to the district boards, increasing also 
the role of native people on administrative affairs, according to Meyer, W.S. et al (1909a: 
287-288) 
The finance of public goods was mainly provided by two revenue sources which are 
studied in this work. The land revenue represented the largest source of revenue at the 
year 1855-56 (Hendriks, F. (1858: 226)) for the administrations. The provincial 
governments were responsible for the land revenue collection (Chaudhary, L. (2010b: 
281) from 1877, as has been already commented, but only received a share of their land 
revenues after the Ripon’s reform (Chaudhary, L. (2010a: 191)), allowing the provincial 
governments to provide grants to district boards and municipalities. Despite an overall 
significant reduction by 1920 signalled by Roy, T. (2006: 318)12, the historical relevance 
                                                          
11 Municipalities also were responsible for the management of Medical services in urban areas. 
12 The magnitude of the decrees is represented by a reduction of overall revenue from 55.5% in 1855-56   
to about 20% in 1920. The same author points at the introduction of other taxes such as an income tax 
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of the land revenue is undeniable. Another main revenue source were the cesses which 
were a surcharge of the land revenue, obtained by the district boards. Data on the 
aggregate district board’s revenue confirms the relevance of cesses at the district level 
of the administration: In the province of Madras, by 1903-04, cesses represented the 
56.79% of the revenue of all local and district boards of the province13. During the 19th 
century, the cesses represented even a larger percentage of the whole Raj district 
boards’ revenue: a 60%. However, district boards were still partly dependent on the 
grants provided by the provincial governments, which, according to Chaudhary, L. 
(2010b: 281), in 1929-30 represented a 43% of the district boards’ income, compared to 
the 36 percent of the cesses.  
Overall, as can be seen in Figure 2.2, cesses as well as the land revenue were affected 
by the reforms mentioned before. Those changes in cesses and land revenue 
emphasised the relevance of institutions such as the land revenue system and the type 
of settlement (which were institutions intrinsically related to those revenue sources, as 
will be analysed in Section III) explaining the revenue differences between districts and 
regions. Also, both reforms gave more responsibilities to provincial (Lord Mayo’s 
Reform) and district (Lord Ripon’s Reform) governments as well as more control over 
their revenue, decentralizing the finance of public goods generally at the district level. 
Figure 2.2. The two main decentralization reforms of the second half of the 19th Century.  
                                                          
and the reduction of the importance of agriculture in the whole Raj economy as the reasons behind this 
decline. 
13 Francis, W. (1908: 139). 
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Source: Own elaboration. The land revenue system and the type of settlement were institutional factors 
(analysed in Section III) that affected both, the land revenue and the local taxes (cesses). The former 
revenue sources suffered important changes with the decentralization reforms (as is signalled in this 
figure) and allowed for a predominant role of those institutions in the public finances of the Raj, as will be 
analysed later on.  
District and local revenues were used to finance locally-provided public goods. Among 
all of these, health was central, as fundamental for human and economic development. 
Historically, public health in India has drawn little attention from the academia. 
Nonetheless, this interest has revived in the last 30 years, when Ramanna, M. (2002) or 
Harrison, M. (1994) published their books on the public health in British India and other 
studies on Namibia, Senegal and other colonial regions also appeared14. Hence, the 
public health topic has not been much studied although its importance has clearly been 
reassessed relatively recently. For the specific case of India, the British medical presence 
is dated from the 17th Century under the Company rule and was followed by a steadily 
increasing number of surgeons. This tendency was proportionally related with the 
expansion of the commercial routes of the Company, although no permanent 
establishment was created until 1763, according to Harrison, M. (1994: 7). As is also 
signalled by the previously mentioned author, military expansionist policies of the 
middle 18th Century explain the creation and further expansion of medical boards in 
each of the three presidencies15 by 1775. The role of those boards was to administer the 
different hospitals of their respective presidencies. According to Harrison, M. (1994: 88) 
from 1830’s onwards, dispensaries began to be established (especially from charitable 
entities), representing the first attempt at introducing western medical care in India.  
Once the western medical care was introduced in the subcontinent and the mentioned 
decentralization reforms became effective, the percentage of public health (medical) 
expenditure16 over total district boards’ expenditure went from a 4.30% in the province 
of Berar to a 20.62% in the province of Madras for the year 1903-0417. Although some 
of those percentages may appear to be small in some cases, there was an important 
variability among the different provinces. Table 2.1 shows the total health expenditure 
                                                          
14 Among those studies Gottschalk, K. (1988) or Echenberg, M. (2002) are some examples. 
15 A presidency was composed of several provinces. This word is generally used to refer to the original 3 
presidencies in the Company’s India: The Bengal presidency, the Bombay presidency and the Madras 
presidency. 
16 Public health expenditure refers to medical expenditure and vice versa all along the present work. 
17 Data obtained from Meyer, W.S. et al (1909) (Volumes 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20 and 24). 
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of the district and municipal administrations (local bodies), the percentage of the district 
boards with respect to the total medical expenditure in those administrations for the 
year 1903-04 and the per capita medical expenditure. 
Table 2.1. Local bodies’ total and per capita medical expenditure for the year 1903-04 
(in rupees). 
Source: Data obtained from the Imperial Gazetteer volumes (Meyer, W.S. et al (1909a)). The nominal 
expenditure has been obtained from the tables representing district boards and municipal revenues and 
expenditures for the year 1903-04. The percentages have been elaborated from the previous information, 
representing the percentage of the district medical expenditure with respect to the sum of the other 
administration’s expenditure. The year of the rupees is not specified, but it’s irrelevant for this analysis. 
The per capita medical expenditure has been calculated using the 1901 Census data available in Meyer, 
W.S. et al (1909) and DB+M represents the sum of municipalities and district boards’ expenditure. 
In the mentioned table, the district boards appear to have an important role financing 
the medical expenditure. The Madras and Assam cases are the most notable, since more 
than 85% of medical expenditure provided by local bodies (district boards and 
municipalities) was done at the district level. As has been signalled previously, district 
boards and municipalities seem to be the main financers of public health expenditure 
(Chand, G. (1947: 230)). Hence, Table 2.1 is expected to represent the majority of the 
public health expenditure in the Raj.  
Focusing on the per capita expenditure, the table also shows an important variability 
among provinces: At the district board level, the province of Madras had an expenditure 
of 0.054 rupees per capita whilst Bengal only spent 0.005 rupees. This variability is also 
present if the expenditure from municipal administrations is considered and, still, 
remains to be explained. 
Province 
Expenditure 1903-04 
Total medical expenditure 
District boards (%) 
Per capita medical expenditure 
District Boards Municipal District Boards Municipal DB+M 
Assam 99578 8965 91,74% 0,019 0,002 0,021 
Bengal 409277 569000 41,84% 0,005 0,008 0,013 
Berar 22546 6499 77,62% 0,008 0,002 0,011 
Bombay 294947 310099 48,75% 0,012 0,012 0,024 
Central 
Provinces 
109154 73486 59,76% 0,009 0,006 0,015 
Coorg 4219 9021 31,87% 0,023 0,050 0,073 
Madras 2064820 339160 85,89% 0,054 0,009 0,063 
North-West 
Frontier 
30967 50574 37,98% 0,015 0,024 0,038 
Punjab 377654 587909 39,11% 0,015 0,024 0,039 
United 
Provinces 
693814 164518 80,83% 0,015 0,003 0,018 
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Concluding, from an income perspective, the decentralization processes did not 
represent the total independence of district boards and municipalities since a 
substantial share of its revenue was obtained from grants from the provincial 
governments. From the expenditure side, linked to the decentralization processes, an 
important variability among regions in the public health expenditure (provision) could 
be observed (see Table 2.1). Trying to explain those differences, the analysis developed 
throughout the next sections of the paper focuses mainly on the district board level (as 
the majority of the population in the subcontinent lived in rural areas, its public health 
(medical) expenditure was relevant overall and allows for a larger number of 
observations than a provincial analysis for Section V). However, this approach has some 
limitations due to the nature of the sources and the data used (see Section IV). 
 
III. The role of institutions and other factors 
The differences in public health expenditure, presented in the previous section, may be 
explained by different mechanisms. To this study, institutions are expected to play an 
important role explaining those differences. However, other mechanisms present in the 
literature are taken into account in order to have a certain robustness on the results 
obtained. Thus, four main factors can be identified as potentially influential to the 
differences in this health expenditure levels: The land revenue systems, the settlement 
types, the caste system and other geographical and regional particularities.  
III.I The land revenue systems and the settlement types 
One possible factor explaining the differences in public health expenditure (provision) 
may be the land revenue system implemented in each district. The various land revenue 
systems can be summarized as in Table 3.1: 
Table 3.1. Main land revenue systems under the British rule. 
Type of revenue 
collection 
Intermediary Village/intermediary No intermediary 
Land revenue 
system 
Zamindari System Mahalwari System Ryotwari System 
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Source: This classification has been used in multiple articles (Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005), Sarwar, F. H. 
(2012) and Iversen, V. et al (2013) are some examples) and is present in all three volumes of Baden-Powell 
(1892). 
In the Zamindary system there was an intermediary between the state and the peasants 
(ryots), the zamindar, who was responsible for the payment of the land revenue to the 
provincial government and who was not necessarily the owner of the land18. The 
Ryotwari system was a land revenue system where there was no intermediary between 
the ryots and the provincial government. Finally, the Mahalwari system was a land 
revenue system where a more or less representative board was responsible for the 
payment of the land revenue. This board could be responsible for the payment of a 
single village or a group of villages (mahal). 
Historically, the British made their first attempt to collect revenue from the land 
cultivators in 1772 just after the acquisition of the Diwani19 right for the Bengal province 
(Bengal and East Bengal, see Figure 3.1). As for the importance of the land in the 
subcontinent’s economy, Bandyopādhyāẏa, Ś. (2004: 82) states that agriculture was the 
main sector of the Indian economy in 1765. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that in 
1772, the Company owned the British territories in the subcontinent and neither district 
nor provincial decentralization reforms (either of revenue sources or expenditure 
responsibilities) were already made. According to Sarwar, F. H. (2012: 16), this first 
attempt to collect revenue from land consisted on an allotment of the collecting rights 
on a contract basis and its geographical applicability was constrained to the Bengal 
province20. According to Baden-Powell, B. H. (1892: 243) the idea was to determine what 
lump-sums the different intermediaries had previously been required to pay in order to 
then adjust and assure that everyone paid what, by law, should. Following this early 
initiative, the permanent settlement was established in Bengal (1793) during the 
Cornwallis21 period. “Permanent” meant that those who held the settlement 
                                                          
18 For the case of zamindars in Bengal, according to Baden-Powell, B. H. (1892: 534) and Stokes, E. (1980: 
2), it cannot be said that they possessed all the land in which they had the right to collect revenue. 
Ultimately, this leads to a differentiation in the rights over a certain plot of land, which is considered by 
certain authors like Roy, T. (2013: 51) but is neglected by others like Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005). 
19 The Diwani rights were the rights by which, in this case, the British East India Company, could collect 
revenues and decide the civil taxes. 
20 There were, until 1793, different types of revenue collection systems that were proved. This is well 
summarized in Ascoli, F. D. (1917). Early Revenue History of Bengal: And the Fifth Report, 1812. Clarendon 
Press. Chapter 3. 
21 Lord Cornwallis was the Governor-General and commander in chief in India from 1786 to 1794. 
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(intermediaries)22 in the province would have a fixed payment, not subject to revision, 
for the land revenue.  
Figure 3.1. Political divisions (provinces) of the Indian Empire (1909). 
Source: Meyer, W.S. et al (1909c). Imperial gazetteer of India. Atlas. 1909 edition. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
The establishment of the permanent settlement in Bengal23 also implied the 
formalization of the Zaminadri system under the British rule in the region. Those holding 
the settlements in Bengal were called zamindars, who during the early modern period 
were the civil servants responsible to collect taxes from the peasantry (Roy, T. (2013: 
51-52)).  
However, the story changes depending on the region of study. Madras, Central 
Provinces, Bombay and other provinces of British India enjoyed various land revenue 
systems. In this regard, Baden-Powell, B. H. (1892: 245) states that Bombay and Madras 
were generally under the Ryotwari system (no intermediary). In this system, the revenue 
collection was done individually (from peasant to peasant), while in the Zamindari 
system, the whole estate held by the zamindar (intermediary) was assessed for revenue. 
In parts of the Central Provinces and North-Western India the Mahalwari system was 
                                                          
22 The person holding the settlement is the person responsible for the land revenue (and cesses) payment. 
Hence, the intermediary according to the British government (Baden-Powell (1892: 339)). 
23 Bengal and East Bengal in Figure 3.1. 
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introduced, although compared with the other two systems, the Mahalwari system was 
the most marginal, according to Haque, T., & Sirohi, A. S. (1986: 29). This type of revenue 
system was characterized by the fact that the revenue was collected from a village or a 
mahal24 as a whole, through the village committee (intermediary). It is important to 
state that generally speaking, those assigned for the revenue collection of the whole 
village or mahal (village committee) were usually the most important families of the 
villages (Stokes, E. (1959: 85)). Hence, it might be stated that this land revenue system 
had a zamindar flavour in its functioning. In this regard, Iversen, V. et al (2013: 10) and 
Stokes, E. (1980: 3) signal this representative intermediary character of the Mahalwari 
system, although it is recognised that in some cases, this system was more similar to the 
Ryotwari than the Zamindari. 
The application of different land revenue systems was not a top-to-bottom decision. The 
British rulers did not, apparently, totally determine the type of land revenue system in 
the different regions. In the case of the Zamindari system in Bengal, as Baden-Powell, B. 
H. (1892: 389) points out: “[…] the principles that underline the Bengal settlement have 
not been without their influence on the later systems, which in many respects depart 
widely from the old Bengal idea.” In this regard, it appears to be clear that the Zamindari 
system was a modernization of the pre-colonial land revenue systems implemented in 
the province. However, Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005: 9) outline that by the end of the 
18th century, there was considerable doubt about the original land revenue system of 
India. Those doubts may have appeared due to an erratic approach to the subject. The 
subcontinent had a wide variety of systems and governments, from the Moghul to the 
Maratha, thus it was impossible to determine one single system for all of India.  
But, was it just history that mattered for the establishment of a certain land revenue 
system? Probably no, the variations on the establishment of different land revenue 
systems should not be exclusively attributed to the precolonial legacy. The British 
agency played also a relevant role in the introduction of the different land revenue 
systems. As Ludden, D. (1993: 257) highlights, the personal approach of some 
functionaries of the Company to the way in which revenue collection had to be made, 
                                                          
24 A mahal represents a territorial division, larger than a single village. 
15 
 
definitely influenced the creation and introduction of some land revenue systems. In 
this regard, Thomas Munro (Governor of Madras from 1820) aimed at destroying all 
intermediaries between the Company and the peasants in order to secure the revenue 
for the Company, ultimately leading to the creation of the Ryotwari system. Similarly, 
Stokes, E. (1959: 87) points at utilitarianism and its repudiation to landlords as the main 
explanatory factor for the introduction of the Ryotwari system and, to a certain extent, 
the Mahalwari system. Hence, the origins of the land revenue systems can by no means, 
be completely attributed to the influence of the British nor to the ancient traditions of 
the subcontinent. In that sense, the potential effect of this institution on the public 
health expenditure (provision) must not be understood as the exclusive effect of the 
influence of British nor Indian tradition. 
As has been presented in the previous section, district boards were enabled to introduce 
surcharges on the land revenue, called cesses. This tax represents the core of the 
mechanism through which the land revenue could have influenced public health 
expenditure. The idea is that the land revenue could have influenced the cesses, and 
those the public health provision in each district, since the cesses were one of the main 
revenue sources for the district boards. According to Chand, G. (1947: 119) “The cesses 
have to be paid by the landlords or the superior proprietors who are responsible for the 
payment of the land-revenue”. The tax base of the cesses varied across provinces 
(Chaudhary, L. (2010b: 282)) while its tax rate was established by the respective district 
boards (Chand, G. (1947: 125)) varying especially between district boards of different 
provinces according to Chaudhary, L., & Garg, M. (2015: 942)25. Overall, the land revenue 
systems could have affected the cesses through the surcharge’s tax rate in two different 
ways. 
One of this ways would be the following. Although it is true that the land revenue that 
was demanded had to be paid, the provincial government (land revenue) or the district 
boards (cesses) could demand more from ryots under the Ryotwari system, who did not 
owe a single rupee to any intermediary, than from a zamindar (Zamindari system), who 
had to make a living of the exploitation of the ryots. This idea of the zamindar profiting 
                                                          
25 This might lead to a certain provincial pattern of public health expenditure, since the main variances 
would potentially be found between provinces. This will be tackled in more depth in Section V and VI. 
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from the rents provided by the ryots is highlighted by Harris, M. S. (1989: 272) and, with 
this perspective, the zamindar might be seen as an economic “parasite”. Hence, in the 
Zamindari system, the resources that could be obtained from the land had to be shared 
among three parties (administration, ryots and zamindars), whilst in the Ryotwari 
system, those resources were divided only between the administration and the ryots. 
This may have led to larger resources captured by the administrations (provincial and 
district boards), through larger tax rates in the Ryotwari system regions (where the 
administrations could secure a larger part of the resources obtained from the land) than 
in those with intermediaries (Zamindari and Mahalwari systems). 
Another way the land revenue systems could have influenced the cesses’ tax rate was 
through the bargaining power of the taxpayers. It is straightforward to assume that the 
zamindars, who were taxpayers negotiating generally, for a large land parcel, would 
have more bargaining power to obtain lower tax charges (especially for the cesses, since 
they had to negotiate with the district board and not with the central government (land 
revenue)) than ryots at the Ryotwari system, where each ryot had to pay for its land 
individually. For the specific case of the zamindars, they could negotiate with the district 
boards the cesses’ tax rate but also with the ryots what share of the revenue obtained 
from the land the former should receive from the ryots26. This idea of the bargaining 
power is as old as economics itself as Adam Smith in his famous work of 1776, the 
Wealth of Nations, (Smith, A. (1987: 83-84)) stated, for the labour bargaining process, 
that the masters would unite much more easily than the workers and that would give 
the former a larger bargaining power than that of the latter. That would allow the 
masters (zamindars) to arrange favourable agreements on the bargaining process (lower 
tax rates leading to lower tax charges).  
The different land revenue systems, therefore, could potentially influence the amount 
of revenue collected by the provincial government, through the land revenue (leading 
to larger or smaller grants for the district boards) as well as the amount collected by the 
district boards through the cesses (Chaudhary, L. (2010a: 194)). For this work, the land 
                                                          
26 This leads to the idea that the zamindars could transfer the effect of cesses’ rates increases to the ryots. 
Even considering this provability, this transfer was limited and the zamindars had obvious incentives to 
negotiate also with the district board for a lower cesses’ rate. 
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revenue system’s effect that is most relevant is the one on cesses, since this kind of 
revenue depended directly on the different district boards. However, it might be the 
case that since certain land revenue systems might provide larger revenues to the 
provincial administrations, it may also provide larger grants to the district boards, 
leading to larger expenditures on public health27. This last mechanism would also work 
the other way around and although it is not directly studied in this work, it definitively 
presents an interesting starting point for future investigation - as well as a potential 
source of bias in the present analysis (see Section IV). 
Apart from the different land revenue systems, there is another institutional factor 
related to the land revenue that could influence the provision of public health (and 
public goods in general), also through the cesses: The settlement type. The payment 
which each tax payer (intermediary or not) had to deliver to the provincial government 
for the land revenue could be either fixed permanently (permanent settlement) or 
revised after a certain number of years28 (temporary settled). As has already been 
pointed out, under the Zamindari system in Bengal, the payments were fixed 
(permanently settled). However, not all provinces where the Zamindari system was 
established had a permanent settlement. For instance, in the majority of the United 
Provinces the Zamindari system was settled temporarily.  In this regard, the Ryotwari 
system was temporarily settled, as well as the Mahalwari system generally.  
Those types of settlements might have had an impact on the cesses’ tax base. The tax 
base for the cesses could be represented either by the annual value29 or by the land 
revenue (Chand, G. (1947: 118)). The former was used as the tax base of the cesses in 
permanently settled land while the later was used in temporary settled land (Chaudhary, 
L. (2010b: 282)). For temporary settled land (where the land revenue was the tax base 
for the cesses) both cesses’ tax base and land revenue were actualized, allowing the 
administrations to take into account productivity increases and price increases in both 
                                                          
27 However, this last mechanism presents more problems than the first one since the grants provided by 
the provincial government to the district boards could be determined by other factors than just the 
revenue available to the provincial government. Among those potential factors, the composition of the 
district board, the relation between the provincial government and the district board or the 
decentralization aim of the provincial government could be signalled. 
28 According to Chaudhary, L. (2010b: 282), temporary settlements were revised every 30 years. 
29 The annual value was defined as the rent paid by the tenant to the intermediary (Chand, G. (1947: 118). 
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revenue sources. On the other hand, for permanently settled land, the tax base of the 
cesses was the annual value, which was fixed with “outdated and inaccurate” surveys 
generally based on the land revenue assessments of 1793 Chaudhary, L. (2010b: 282). 
Hence, the ability to change the cesses tax base as well as the land revenue depended 
on the type of settlement. More precisely, it could be expected that the cesses obtained 
from temporary settled areas might have been higher than the ones from permanently 
settled areas since the former could take into account the productivity and price 
increases. It must be said, however, that the rigidity of the cesses to changes in 
agriculture (Chaudhary, L. (2010b: 282)), due to the fact that the temporary settlement 
was actualized only after large periods (generally, after 30 years), might somehow have 
mitigated this effect. 
Figure 3.1. Land revenue systems and settlement types influence over cesses and district 
board’s public health provision.  
Notes: As has been commented in this subsection, it is assumed that larger cesses would allow the district 
board to have larger public health expenditure. 
Thus, the type of land revenue system and the way in which it was settled (permanently 
or temporarily) might have influenced the level of public health provision in each district 
through both, land revenue and cesses. The present document is focused on the cesses 
effect, since it provided significant differences for the district boards’ revenue 
(Chaudhary, L., & Garg, M. (2015: 942)) and its rates were managed by the district boards 
directly (Chand, G. (1947: 125)). It is expected that those systems with an intermediary 
(Zamindari and Mahalwari) would lead to lower revenue than the one without 
intermediary (Ryotwari) as well as land permanently settled with respect to temporary 
settled through the mechanisms summarized in Figure 3.1. All this explains the 
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introduction of the land revenue system and the way it was settled as explanatory 
variables in the regressions made in this work (see Section V).  
III.II  The caste system as an explicative factor of public health provision 
Another institutional factor that could explain the differences in the provision of public 
health at the district level was the caste fragmentation. According to Easterly, W., & 
Levine, R. (1997: 1206), ethnic diversity (or social polarization) is strongly correlated with 
factors such as investments in public goods with poor economic growth results. Another 
prominent study regarding the effect of ethnic diversity on economic performance is 
Alesina, A., & Ferrara, E. L. (2005), whose units of study are local communities in the USA 
and undeveloped countries. Those authors present a simple theoretical model which 
summarizes the literature on this topic, considering potential positive and negative 
effects of ethnic diversity. Among those effects of ethnic diversity influencing economic 
decisions, it can be found the potential enlargement of cooperative strategies among 
members of the same group, a preference for transactions between the members of the 
same group and a direct effect on the utility function of the individuals. In conclusion, 
there appears to be a trade-off regarding ethnic heterogeneity in which “The potential 
benefits of heterogeneity come from variety in production [referring to private goods 
production]. The costs come from the inability to agree on common public goods and 
public policies” (Alesina, A., & Ferrara, E. L. (2005: 7)).  
This relationship between homogeneous ethnic groups and larger public goods 
provision is also find in Gennaioli, N., & Rainer, I. (2007). In this case, the authors focus 
on the African continent and use a measure on the politic organization of each ethnic 
group, previous to the European administrative rule, in order to state the relation 
between ethnic homogeneity and public goods provision. In fact, the conclusion at 
which those authors arrive goes beyond the previously mentioned literature as 
Gennaioli, N., & Rainer, I. (2007: 216-219) find historical evidence on a positive relation 
between precolonial centralization and local public goods in the colonial and 
postcolonial period, driven by more accountability on local chiefs. Finally, Nunn, N. 
(2008) and Banerjee, A., & Somanathan, R. (2007) also point at the ethnic (social) 
diversity as a factor explaining the actual provision of public goods. 
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Hence, similarly to the previously mentioned literature, this document looks for a 
potential effect of the caste diversity or concentration on the expenditure (provision) of 
public health. It is expected that those areas with more caste diversity would have lower 
levels of public goods provision (in this case, lower levels of public health expenditure) 
since larger social uniformity might lead to more political consensus on public policies, 
which might result in larger public goods provision. Nonetheless, two elements must be 
taken into account in this regard: First of all, a caste system is different from ethnic 
diversity. However, group differentiation within the society also occurs, so it might be 
stated that the mechanism by which differences in ethnic groups influence the provision 
of public goods and economic growth could be applied to the caste differentiation. 
Secondly, it may be that, as Alesina, A., & Ferrara, E. L. (2005) underlined for the ethnic 
differences, caste differentiation ends up having a positive impact on economic growth. 
For the present study, this result would definitely be an unexpected one, since this work 
is focused on the level of public health and not on production of private goods and/or 
services. 
For the specific case of India, Banerjee, A., et al (2005: 644) appear to find a negative 
correlation between caste and religious fragmentation and primary public health 
provision with data from 1991 for the last and 1920’s for caste and religious 
fragmentation in India. Baru, R. et al (2010: 50-51) underline the important differences 
existent nowadays in the accessibility to health services between regions and between 
caste groups. Similarly, Borooah, V. K., & Iyer, S. (2005: 43) identify an effect of caste on 
school enrolment for the years 1993-94, although the magnitude of this effect depends 
on non-community circumstances (like the literacy of the parents). Hence, literature 
appears to signal the caste system as a potential explanatory factor of divergences in 
the public goods provision and accessibility for the specific case of India.  
The historical roots of the caste system in the Indian subcontinent are not as 
straightforward as most academics would predict at first sight. The initially dominant 
explanation was that the caste system was an almost intrinsic characteristic of the Indian 
society. Accordingly, the first formulation of a segregationist social system was done 
following the Aryan invasions of the Hindustan peninsula, approximately at the 
beginning of the Rig-Vedic period (1750 B.C), with the purpose of “preserve[ing] and 
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rationalize their superiority, the Aryans had to emphasize and maintain their racial 
distance from the indigenous community” ((Gupta, D. (1980: 253)). In this regard, the 
Aryans created a system of social segmentation according to the skin colour (Varna 
system) from which four main different social groups can be distinguished: the 
Brahmans, who were priests and teachers, shared the exploitative and dominant status 
with the warriors (Kshatriyas). The Vaishyas, who were peasants and artisans, and the 
Shudras (servants), were the social groups more adversely affected by the system30. In 
that sense, Dumont, L. (1980: 73) signals a clear “homology […] between the two 
systems, [caste and Varna]”, which leads to the idea that the caste system already 
existed with the Varna system. However, according to this initial perspective, this 
system has not been completely stagnated into the Rig-Vedic period, and other social 
divisions have emerged with the introduction of the Jati system. This 
classification/system represents, according to De Zwart, F. (2000: 236), the different 
contexts at which the caste system may be represented (at the local, regional or national 
level). Summarizing this view of the roots of the caste system, it might be said that the 
characterization of the origins of the caste system appears as an ancient given.  
Nonetheless, some academics have introduced a different perspective to the previously 
presented. This view introduces the importance of the state in the creation of the caste 
Dirks, N. B. (1989: 3), leading to a constructivist critique of the “ancient given” 
perspective. Hence, as Dirks, N. B. (1989: 4) outlines, the caste’s structure, ritual and 
political form relied on the relations of power. This relations of power changed through 
history and were constructed also during the British colonial rule. Thus the British 
colonial rule itself played a role (as part of the subcontinent’s history) in the modelling 
of the caste system according to this perspective. 
Dirks, N. B. (2001: 20) clarifies that the caste system was present in India previously to 
the arrival of the British, however, its role on the society does not appear to be 
important. This seems to be the case not just because Europe itself was organized in 
hierarchical forms (making this organization form less surprising or worth mentioning 
for the first Europeans that arrived to India) but also because the relevance of the castes 
                                                          
30 Other social groups can be distinguished during the Rig-Vedic period: The Dasas who were enslaved 
enemies of the Aryans with no right to property of any kind. 
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appeared to be neither dominant nor clear.  This approach was first introduced by 
Bernard S. Cohn, who understood the mutiny of 1957, ending with the coronation of 
Queen Victoria as empress of India and the trial to the Moghul emperor, as the turning 
point leading to the introduction of new “[…] means by which Indians now could relate 
to this centre, [this new authority] and the development of the ritual expression of British 
authority in India.” (Cohn, B. S. (1983: 179)). With this in mind, the caste system stood 
out among those means. 
According to this view, the British colonisation presented an important turning point 
consolidating the caste system with cultural and religious characteristics of the past 
regimes but with a dominant role in society. In this regard, the concept of Orientalism is 
especially relevant. According to Ludden, D. (1993: 251) it is a body of knowledge that 
presents: 
“A venerable set of factualized statements about the Orient, which was established with 
authorized data and research techniques that has come so widely accepted as true […] 
that it determines the content of assumptions on which theory and inference can be 
built”.  
Therefore, Orientalism, which started in India during the Company rule, planted the 
seeds for future investigation, that actually lead (according to this perspective) to the 
creation of a larger theoretical corpus that has dominated the historiography of India 
for years (even after the colonial rule31). Thus, from this view, company’s officials as 
Thomas Munro were especially important in the creation of colonial knowledge32 at 
their will and political interest, as Ludden, D. (1993: 257) exemplifies.  
In conclusion, it appears to be the case that the caste system was modelled during the 
colonial rule with the structure of ancient cultural and religion relations, but isolated 
from the political and social processes at which it was previously attached. However, the 
caste system did somehow already existed in the subcontinent, although its 
systematization and effectiveness was rather doubtful. However, the “desacralization 
                                                          
31 For more on the mechanisms by which Orientalism, in the form of a developed theoretical corpus, has 
survived through the colonial period, see Ludden, D. (1993: 272). 
32 According to Ludden, D. (1993: 252), colonial knowledge is represented as “[…] instrumental knowledge, 
produced to sustain technologies of colonial rule”. 
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of the person of the Mughal emperor […]” (Cohn, B. S. (1983: 178)) lead to the creation 
of a social organization system based on the antique culture and tradition and used by 
the British to peacefully hold the jewel in the crown.  Therefore, it might be stated that 
the potential effect on public health expenditure lead by the caste system institution 
(similarly to the land revenue systems), cannot be attributed (at least solely) to ancient 
traditions assumed as given to the colonial overlords but (also) to the policies of the 
colonial government itself. Hence, there appears to be both, a certain path dependence 
effect and a colonial shock in this institution.  
III.III The potential effect of regional particularities in the provision of public health 
Taking into account the institutional factors signalled previously in this section, the 
literature has also pointed at some other explanatory factors of the levels of public 
expenditure and/or economic development which do not explicitly refer to an 
institution. In that sense, the following potentially influential factors are generally of a 
geographical nature. Hence, Roy, T. (2014: 346) points at that type of factors as the main 
explanation to the regional divergence in British India. The methodology used by Roy is 
based on the comparison among the area of deltas, coasts and floodplains of the 
Himalayan Rivers and the arid uplands of the interior of the subcontinent. Although it is 
not done by Roy, provinces could somehow be used as proxies of those geographical 
areas, since they were more or less homogeneous in their geography (see Table 6.1). 
Several studies (Banerjee, A., & Somanathan, R. (2007) or Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005)) 
use a different strategy (criticised by Roy, T. (2014: 332)): They take into account the 
geographical endowment. Essentially, they consider data on the type of soil and rainfall 
among others to represent the geographical factors that could influence the agricultural 
production and public goods provision. Furthermore, with this approach to the potential 
geographical influence, those studies find geographical factors of minor importance 
compared to the institutional factors. 
Bearing the two previous approaches in mind, the geographical factor appears to be of 
special relevance in order to explain the regional differences in India. However, the way 
in which those geographical factors are taken into account is not uniform in the 
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literature. In this regard, as will be seen in the upcoming sections, it is tried to consider 
the two previously presented approaches in the present analysis.  
Another factor that could be signalled as an important one is the level of agglomeration. 
In this regard, as Gallup, J. L. et al (1999: 184) point out, there might be a relation 
between population density and economic development. This relation, nonetheless, is 
not as simple as it might seem. According to the previously mentioned authors, 
population density in coastal regions seems favourable to economic development 
thanks to a good access to trade and increasing returns to scale of infrastructures. On 
the other hand, population density in interior regions appears not to induce economic 
development as is signalled by Gallup, J. L. et al (1999: 184). Following this framework, 
it is seek to control for a potential effect of population density on the expenditure on 
public health. The mechanism by which this effect might occur is similar to the previously 
presented relation between population density and economic development: It could be 
expected that those regions with high population density would have larger per capita 
expenditure on public health. This argument is extremely related with the New 
Economic Geography theory (NEG). Similarly to the economies of scale and forward 
linkages presented by large local markets in the NEG (Krugman, P. (1998: 8)), the public 
goods might also enjoy those characteristics depending on the population density. 
Finally, another factor that could directly influence the expenditure on public health 
were the famines and scarcities which the subcontinent regions suffered, at different 
degrees through the Victorian era. In this regard, Davis, M. (2002: 287) classifies those 
events not just as natural disasters but also as the result of policies implemented by the 
Britons. Those famines could potentially affect the per capita public expenditure on 
health in three different ways: Firstly, famines could simply influence the per capita 
public health expenditure through a reduction of the total population. This reduction 
would positively affect the per capita public expenditure. Secondly, it could be stated 
that those districts that suffered more famines and scarcities in the past may have more 
expenditure in public health due to pressure from the population or simply due to a 
certain responsibility from the government to justify its existence. Finally, it might be 
stated that, following the systemic approach by Davis, M. (2002), famines and scarcities 
were, partially, the result of a low investment and unappropriated policies from the 
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state, which might include the public health expenditure. Whilst the other mechanisms 
for famines and scarcities presented a potentially positive relationship between this 




Following the previously presented factors that can potentially explain the differences 
in the public health expenditure and the reasoning behind this potential influence, it is 
necessary to discuss the data used in Section V, how it is presented and its potential 
biases to shed more light on the issue. The econometric analysis presented in Section V 
has been done exclusively with primary sources, which vary from the census of 1901 to 
the Agricultural Statistics of India report of 1904. Geographically, the districts analysed 
are from the provinces of Bengal, Bombay, Central Provinces, Madras, Agra’s division 
(United Provinces) and Punjab.  
Taking into account everything said before, for some districts of the mentioned 
provinces there was no data, hence, the overall number of districts (observations) in the 
sample has been reduced to 152. Those districts represented the 79% of the total 
population of the Raj by 1901, hence, the set of districts used in this document appears 
to be representative of the whole Raj regarding quantity and geographical distribution, 
as is shown in Figure 4.1. 
Data on the type of land revenue is presented as a percentage of land under a land 
revenue system with an intermediary (Zamindari system or Mahalwari system) over the 
total land surveyed per district in acres and has been obtained from the Agricultural 
Statistics of India report of 1904. The three types of land revenue are not represented 
in this work, since they have been gathered into two groups: One in which there is an 
intermediary between the cultivator and the state (Zamindari and Mahalwari) and a 
second one in which no intermediary existed (Ryotwari). The reasons behind this 
classification were that, in the Agricultural Statistics of India report of 1904, no 
distinction between the Zamindari and the Mahalwari systems could be appreciated 
since they were always aggregated and, the Mahalwari system may be considered as a 
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system with intermediaries. This classification presents the first potential bias of the 
present study, since the Mahalwari system is directly classified as a system with 
intermediaries. As has been mentioned in Section III, the Mahalwari system might not 
always be a system with a small number of privileged intermediaries but it could have a 
more representative set of intermediaries (leading to a more Ryotwari type of system). 
To correct this bias, a district by district analysis would have to be done, which could be 
considered as an impossible task given the time and resources constraints characterizing 
this work. Such bias is expected not to have a dramatic effect in the ongoing analysis 
since the Mahalwari system was the less spread system33. The data on the type of 
settlement also comes from the Agricultural Statistics of India report of 1904 and is 
presented as a dummy variable, where 0 represents a district with more land 
permanently settled than temporarily settled and 1 the other way around. 
Figure 4.1. The British India map with the districts used in Section V highlighted (in 
green). 
Source: Base map from Roy, T. (2014). Geography or politics? Regional inequality in colonial India. 
European Review of Economic History, 18(3), 324-348. Own elaboration. 
 
                                                          
33 For more details on that see Haque, T., & Sirohi, A. S. (1986). 
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Table 4.1 Summary of the variables included in the models of Section V. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Regarding the data on the caste fragmentation within each district, it has been obtained 
from the various Imperial tables in the 1901 Census volumes. In this regard, similarly to 
Chaudhary, L., & Garg, M. (2015) or Banerjee, A., & Somanathan, R. (2007), a 
fragmentation index (alike the Herfindahl Index) which in this work is called Caste 
Fragmentation Index (CFI) has been created for the 152 districts (observations). This 
Caste Fragmentation Index has been constructed following this formula: 𝐶𝐹𝐼 = 1 −
∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where S represents the weight of each caste with respect to the total 
population of the district (observation). The value range of this index is (0,1) where 
numbers close to 0 represent high caste concentration and vice versa. Since the main 
objective of this fragmentation index is to consider the caste fragmentation effect, 
different religious population of the same caste (which is generally rare in the districts 
analysed) have been aggregated into a single caste. For this index, only those castes 
                                                          
34 The years of the mentioned average are not specified in Meyer, W.S. et al (1909). In this source, it is 
generally said that the average has been done “[…] over a long series of years […]” Meyer, W.S. et al 
(1909b: 307). 
Name (label in models) Description Source 
Intermediary (inter) 
Percentage of land with a land 
revenue system with an intermediary 
over the total land surveyed in each 
district. 
Agricultural Statistics 
of India report of 
1904. 
Type of settlement (settl) 
Dummy variable indicating the type 
of settlement most common in a 
district. 
Agricultural Statistics 
of India report of 
1904. 
Caste Fragment. Index (CFI) 
Herfindhal Index using castes 
representing a 1% or more of the 




Percentage of the Brahman caste 





Average annual rainfall in each 
district34. 
Imperial Gazetteer of 
1909 (Meyer, W.S. et 
al (1909)) 
Coast (coast) 
Dummy variable indicating if the 
district has access to sea or not. 
Imperial Gazetteer of 
1909 (Meyer, W.S. et 
al (1909)) 
Famine (famine) 
Number of years of famine or food 
scarcity from 1804 to 1904. 
Imperial Gazetteer of 




representing a 1% or more of the district population have been included. The reason 
behind this limitation on the castes taken into account is to avoid the potential 
introduction of mistakes regarding the caste identification and enumeration, as is 
argued in Banerjee, A., & Somanathan, R. (2007). The percentage of brahmans35 with 
respect to the total population of each district has also been obtained from the Census 
of 1901, which is used to complement the caste concentration with the particular case 
of the brahmans (elite). 
Data on the annual average rainfall (in inches), the years of famine or scarcity for the 
1804-1904 period and whether each district has coast or not have been obtained from 
the Imperial Gazetteer of 1909 (Meyer, W.S. et al (1909)). The average rainfall has not 
been found for some districts, alternatively, the average rainfall on the capital city of the 
district or the mean average rainfall of certain regions of the district has been used. 
Regarding the years of famine or scarcity, the data from the Imperial Gazetteer presents 
some potential biases that are worth mentioning: It is probable that not all famines were 
registered in the gazetteer and the definition of scarcity is clearly subjective. Also, the 
magnitude of each scarcity and famine years is not considered, since no weight is applied 
to each year. Nonetheless, it is believed that the number of years in which there was a 
scarcity or famine in the district is the most likely to capture the effect of famines or 
scarcity in the public health provision. 
Data on public health expenditure has been obtained from the Imperial Gazetteer of 
1909 (Meyer, W.S. et al (1909)). In this source, the 1903-04 expenditure in hospitals and 
dispensaries for each district have been found. Although there is another source in 
which the whole district board medical expenditure is reported, containing tables 
concerning expenditures by district boards only, the availability of this source is 
relatively low36. Thus, the expenditure data used includes the whole expenditure made 
in the district (either from the provincial or central government, the district board or 
even private contributions). Inevitably, the use of this source brings about some 
potential biases: Firstly, using just the aggregate expenditure does not allow to 
                                                          
35 As has been mentioned in Section III, the brahmans were the traditional caste elite. 
36 This data source are the different district gazetteers, which are available in some libraries of the United 
Kingdom, USA and India basically. 
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differentiate the district boards’ expenditure from the rest. Also, including all the 
expenditure in a district (not just the one of district boards) might allow some variables 
that are not taken into account in the present work37 (like the capacity of the district to 
capture provincial or central investment) to play a role in the regressions made in 
Section V. Secondly, as previously mentioned in Section III: The impact of the land 
revenue systems on the land revenue collected by the provincial government might 
affect the resources available to the district boards (through grants). This alternative 
mechanism could be individually analysed through the use of district board’s public 
health (medical) expenditure but not using the whole public health (medical) 
expenditure on each district. Last but not least, another potential bias to consider is the 
fact that only hospital and dispensaries expenditure is taken into account. After all, this 
could hide potential differences or tendencies that may appear adding other medical 
expenditures (such as vaccine expenditures) which would enrich the statistical 
modelling of Section V. Despite the potential noise in this preliminary analysis, the 
weight of local financing by the rural district boards, as well as the prominent role that 
they played in the funding of public health, point out the relevance of the institutional 
mechanisms presented above: although future research may refine the estimates, the 
qualitative historical information available to date suggests that a quantitative 
investigation of the issue is worth performing.  
 
V. Model and results 
The model developed in this work is a simple cross-section OLS regression model with 
the following formula: 
𝑝𝑐𝑒𝑥𝑝_𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖 =  𝑐 + 𝛼𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝐼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖 ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑎ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛 +  𝛾𝑖,𝑧 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑧 + 𝑖 
The relationship that is analysed, therefore, is a linear one with the coefficients α, β, δ 
and θ representing the influence of institutional variables in the public health (medical) 
expenditure and uses districts as observations. More precisely, Pcexp_tot represents the 
total expenditure on hospitals and dispensaries in each district (i) for the year 1903-04. 
                                                          
37 Those variables used in this work have already been extensively commented in Section III. 
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Inter shows the proportion of the total area surveyed which had a land revenue system 
with intermediary (Zamindari or Mahalwari) in each district during 1903-04 and has a 
range between 0 and 1. Settle is a dummy variable, as has been previously mentioned, 
where 0 indicates that the district had a majority of permanently settled areas and 1 a 
majority of temporary settled areas in 1903-04. The CFI shows the values of the Caste 
Fragmentation Index, brahman shows the percentage of brahmans with respect to 
district’s total population in 1901 and, CONTROL represents a matrix of all the controls 
which are presented in subsection III.III. Those controls include: Population 
agglomeration (popagg), which is the coefficient between the total population (1901) of 
each district and its total surveyed area (1903-04), the annual average rainfall in inches 
(rain), the number of famines and scarcities the district has suffered through the last 
century (from 1804 to 1904) (famine) and whether the district has a coast (1) or not (0) 
(coast).  
With the arguments presented in Section III in mind, the variable inter is expected to 
have a negative impact on pcexp_tot and the CFI is also believed to have a negative 
impact on the dependant variable. On the contrary, settl is expected to have a positive 
impact on the public health expenditure on hospitals and dispensaries. Popagg, 
brahman, rain and coast are also expected to have a positive effect on public health 
expenditure, whilst famine could have both, a positive or a negative effect. 
The model presented in Table 5.1 introduces the initial results taking into account all the 
data mentioned previously. As can be appreciated, almost no variable, except the CFI 
appears to be significant at a 10% of significance level. The coefficient for the CFI is 
positive, and represents that a unitary increase in the CFI (meaning to change, from total 
caste concentration to total caste heterogeneity) leads to a change in the total district 
hospitals and dispensaries expenditure of 0.10 rupees per capita. In order to check for 
the validity of this results, it is interesting to look at Graphic 5.1 and Graphic 5.2. 
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Graphic 5.1. Caste Fragmentation Index (CFI) against total district hospital and 
dispensaries expenditure. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Graphic 5.2. Intermediary variable against total district hospital and dispensaries 
expenditure. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table 5.1. OLS regression model with all the observations. 
Notes: P>|t| represents the p-value for each variable in the regression. 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0338326   .0446812    -0.76   0.450                        .
       settl    -.0041662   .0220579    -0.19   0.850                -.0269963
      famine    -.0026754   .0030253    -0.88   0.378                -.1454148
         cfi     .1083685   .0568382     1.91   0.059                 .1915255
     brahman     .0364421   .1130854     0.32   0.748                 .0211008
      popagg    -.0021504   .0048072    -0.45   0.655                -.0198922
       coast    -.0274818   .0184469    -1.49   0.138                -.1558398
        rain     .0004368   .0003029     1.44   0.152                 .1753118
       inter    -.0352566   .0286705    -1.23   0.221                -.2000722
                                                                              
   pcexp_tot        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .06672
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0780
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.2244
                                                       F(  8,   143) =    1.35
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     152
33 
 
In the previous two graphics, it appears clear that a small number of observations is 
driving all the regression due to an extraordinary high per capita hospital and 
dispensaries expenditure. There are two potential explanations to this exceptional per 
capita expenditure: First of all, since the expenditure taken into account is only on 
hospitals and dispensaries, there is a large proportion of that expenditure that might be 
fixed. It is straightforward to assume that an important proportion of hospital 
expenditures is fixed and cannot be avoided, leading to impressively large per capita 
expenditures in low populated areas (as seems to be the case in the present sample). 
Last but not least, military hospital expenditures and exceptionally large capital 
investments made in the 1903-04 year were considered in the total expenditure of some 
districts for the mentioned year. 
Doing a simple exercise, relations between the hospital and dispensaries per capita 
expenditure and the CFI or the inter variables appear clearer. Omitting those districts 
with more than a 0.1 rupees per capita hospital and dispensary expenditure 
observations from the dataset eliminates those outliers and only 5 observations are 
eliminated. It should be said that the number 0.1 is more or less arbitrary, but it 
definitely does not affect the representation of the sample since it continues having a 
certainly large number of observations (147). Graphic 5.3 and Graphic 5.4 show the 
relations between inter, CFI and public health expenditure once only those observations 
(147) with a per capita hospital and dispensaries expenditure lower than 0.1 are 
considered. 
In Graphic 5.3, it appears to be more or less clear that no relation between the CFI and 
the pcexp_tot existed. A quadratic relation has been tested and CFI continued not being 
significant at a 10%. Graphic 5.4 shows a certain negative relationship between 
pcexp_tot and inter, corroborating the hypothesis presented in Section III that those 
districts with land revenue systems with intermediaries (Zamindari or Mahalwari) 
presented a lower per capita medical expenditure. This relation is also observed in Table 
5.2. 
Having in mind this outliers’ problem, the next step in the analysis is to take into account 
them through a more elegant and reliable method than simply omitting those 
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observations with a pcexp_tot>0.1. Hence, a data-dependent method for down 
weighting those outliers is used for the regression in Table 5.238. 
Graphic 5.3. Caste Fragmentation Index (CFI) against total district hospital and 
dispensaries expenditure without pcexp_tot>0.1 observations. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Graphic 5.4. Intermediary variable against total district hospital and dispensaries 
expenditure without pcexp_tot>0.1 observations. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The new regression (Table 5.2) differs dramatically from the first one (Table 5.1). In this 
case, there are 4 variables which appear to be significant at a significance level of 10%: 
                                                          
38 In order to do so, the command rreg for the statistical program STATA has been used. A model omitting 
those observations with a value superior to 0.1 has also been done. The results (in significance and 




The intermediary (inter), the average rainfall (rain), the number of famines and scarcities 
(famine) and the type of settlement (settl).  
This means that there appear to be two institutional variables and two CONTROL 
variables which are significant. The coefficient for inter shows that a variation from a 
land revenue system proportion in a district of totally non intermediary (Ryotwari) (0) 
to a totally intermediary land revenue system (Zamindari or Mahalwari) (1) leads to a 
decrease of 0.0078 rupees per capita in the hospital and dispensaries expenditure. With 
this change, the reduction of the per capita hospital and dispensaries expenditure 
represents a 17.15% of the mean expenditure of the sample used39. This result seems to 
confirm the original hypothesis that those districts with a majority of intermediary land 
revenue systems would have lower public health expenditure. The coefficient for the 
variable settl shows that if a district has a majority of its land temporary settled, its per 
capita expenditure in public health increases by 0.0072 rupees. This increase represents 
a 15.83% of the mean expenditure of the sample. This last results is also coherent with 
the hypothesis presented in Section III, in which it was argued that those districts with 
more land temporary settled would have a larger public health provision. 
Regarding the rain variable, the results presented in Table 5.2 suggest that for an inch 
increase in the average rainfall of the district, the per capita expenditure in hospitals and 
dispensaries would be reduced in 0.00008 rupees. This represents a 0.17% of the 
average expenditure of the sample. This effect has an unexpected sign since more rain 
could mean larger agricultural productivity, and that, more revenue collected from the 
cesses and the land revenue. Finally, the famine variable indicates that an additional 
year of famine reduced the hospital and dispensaries per capita expenditure in a district 
by 0.00054 rupees, representing a 1.19% of the average expenditure of the sample. This 
result fits with the idea that low public health provision allowed for more famines. Also, 
the causality can be inverted: It might be the case that more famines in a district lowered 
its land revenue (and cesses), leading to a lower expenditure on public goods (including 
public health). 
                                                          
39 The mean was calculated without omitting or down weighting the outliers present in the sample. Hence, 
the percentages indicated regarding the effect on the per capita expenditure would be larger as long as 
this consideration was done. 
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Table 5.2. OLS regression model using a down weighting method for the outliers. 
Notes: P>|t| represents the p-value for each variable in the regression. 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0292046   .0080236     3.64   0.000     .0133444    .0450648
       settl     .0072639   .0022516     3.23   0.002     .0028132    .0117146
      famine    -.0005459   .0002698    -2.02   0.045    -.0010791   -.0000127
         cfi     .0004658   .0077724     0.06   0.952    -.0148979    .0158294
     brahman    -.0080896   .0212376    -0.38   0.704    -.0500697    .0338905
      popagg    -.0008006   .0013756    -0.58   0.561    -.0035198    .0019185
       coast     .0024579   .0023524     1.04   0.298    -.0021922    .0071079
        rain    -.0000803   .0000341    -2.35   0.020    -.0001477   -.0000128
       inter    -.0078435   .0026679    -2.94   0.004    -.0131172   -.0025699
                                                                              
   pcexp_tot        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,   143) =    5.90
Robust regression                                      Number of obs =     152
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Finally, a dummy variable for all provinces has been introduced in a new model (Table 
5.3). This has been done in order to test for an explicitly different public health 
expenditure between provinces and to check geographical factors in a way that not just 
the average rainfall and geographical qualities are considered but also area or spatial 
characteristics (mountainous areas, deltas and floodplains among others), similarly to 
what is done in Roy, T. (2014). The results obtained in Table 5.3 show that the majority 
of the dummy provincial variables appeared to be significant at a 10%, indicating a 
certain provincial effect on the public health expenditure. The control variable is the 
dummy for the Agra division, hence, the coefficients obtained must be compared with 
Agra’s expenditure. 
Table 5.3. Provincial dummies explaining the public health expenditure. 
Notes: P>|t| represents the p-value for each variable in the regression. The control variable for this 
regression is the dummy for the Agra division. 
However, when other variables were additively taken into account, this provincial effect 
vanishes almost completely as can be seen in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. Provincial dummies and the rest of the variables explaining the public health 
expenditure. 
                                                                                   
            _cons     .0160537   .0013319    12.05   0.000     .0134219    .0186854
           punjab     .0125231   .0020064     6.24   0.000     .0085587    .0164875
           bombay       .01048   .0022419     4.67   0.000     .0060501    .0149098
           madras     .0115588   .0021358     5.41   0.000     .0073386    .0157789
central_provinces     .0057621   .0022842     2.52   0.013     .0012488    .0102755
           bengal    -.0004644   .0017894    -0.26   0.796        -.004    .0030712
                                                                                   
        pcexp_tot        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                   
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   150) =   16.93




Notes: P>|t| represents the p-value for each variable in the regression. The control variable for this 
regression is Agra. 
Analysing Table 5.4, it must be said that as the provincial effect partially vanishes with 
the introduction of institutional and geographical variables, this last variables’ effect also 
tends to disappear. This could explain a certain relation between institutional and 




Taking into account the results previously presented, caution is granted in their 
interpretation, given the potential bias due to the sources used and time constraint 
related to this research. However, some ideas and preliminary conclusions can be 
underlined. 
It appears to be that those institutions with a formal character (land revenue system and 
the type of settlement) had an important effect over the public health expenditure 
whilst the caste (informal institution) fragmentation seems not to have a significant 
effect. In this regard, during the middle years of the British crown rule, it seems to be 
that those institutions having an effect on the public revenue had a larger influence over 
                                                                                   
            _cons     .0235434   .0100307     2.35   0.020     .0037096    .0433772
           punjab     .0129362   .0026027     4.97   0.000       .00779    .0180825
           bombay      .007421   .0073323     1.01   0.313    -.0070772    .0219192
           madras     .0061227   .0072355     0.85   0.399     -.008184    .0204293
central_provinces     .0080116   .0028201     2.84   0.005     .0024354    .0135878
           bengal      .002675   .0031275     0.86   0.394    -.0035091     .008859
            settl     .0027641   .0027714     1.00   0.320    -.0027159     .008244
           famine    -.0003344    .000244    -1.37   0.173     -.000817    .0001481
              cfi    -.0015729    .006861    -0.23   0.819    -.0151392    .0119935
          brahman     .0344791   .0220242     1.57   0.120    -.0090693    .0780276
           popagg     -.000047   .0012204    -0.04   0.969      -.00246     .002366
            coast     .0027841    .002316     1.20   0.231    -.0017953    .0073636
             rain    -.0000552    .000033    -1.67   0.097    -.0001204      .00001
            inter    -.0075493   .0072962    -1.03   0.303    -.0219761    .0068776
                                                                                   
        pcexp_tot        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                   
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 13,   138) =    6.76
Robust regression                                      Number of obs =     152
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the provision of public health than those influencing the social cohesion and public 
policies consensus. The relevance of those formal institutions is definitely clear albeit 
not crucial, since a variation from a Zamindari or Mahalwari system permanently settled 
in a district to a Ryotwari system temporary settled represents a 33% of the mean 
expenditure of the sample (0.0151 rupees per capita).  
The differences between the district board’s medical expenditure (signalled in Section 
II) appear in the analysis made in the previous section. The results seem to support the 
idea that institutions such as the land revenue system and the type of settlement 
influenced the cesses and that, influenced the expenditure on public health40. However, 
some of the results obtained in this work could be influenced by potentially omitted 
variables influencing the public health expenditure of the provincial and/or central 
government. Also, the potential effect that the land revenue system or the type of 
settlement might have on the revenue of the provincial governments and, ultimately, 
on the public health expenditure in each district (through grants) must definitively be 
studied in further detail41. With the results obtained in this work, this last mechanism 
can, by no means, be discarded. One way or another, what appears to be suggested by 
the results of this work is that institutions (especially the formal ones) had an important 
role determining the expenditure (provision) of public health.  
The dissimilarities between institutions in their impact on public health may lead to 
interesting interpretations regarding the origins of those institutions. As long as the land 
revenue system was exclusively implemented from an ancient tradition, its effect over 
the public coffers might be expected to be very important due to its persistence through 
a path dependence process. With this in mind, although being a completely subjective 
statement, the results obtained may provide some evidence strengthening the idea 
previously presented in this work: The land revenue system was neither an institution 
created totally for the British nor an institution apathetic to the past of time. For the 
caste system, the lack of significance of the fragmentation index and the Brahman 
variable may have two different interpretations. Either the caste system had no 
                                                          
40 This influence seems to be positive for the land revenue systems without intermediaries and also for 
the temporary settled districts (as is expected from Section III). 
41 The way in which grants were distributed could have an influence also on the public goods provision. 
This is not analysed in this work, although it should be in future investigation. 
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influence on the medical expenditure or the colonial influence on this institution was 
huge and its role explaining the public health provision did not appear until later42. Thus, 
the effective influence of each institution on the public health expenditure might 
present some information reading their historical roots. 
On the other hand, the role of geography and famines appears to be less important than 
that of institutions when studying the case of public health expenditure at least 
(although definitely not meaningless). Measuring this geographical factor as the average 
rainfall, it appears as a statistically-significant variable, but its influence is relatively low 
(a 50 inches increase in the average rainfall only represents a reduction of public health 
expenditure of a 8.5% of the sample’s mean expenditure). Furthermore, the sign of the 
coefficient for this variable is not the expected one, since a larger average rainfall would 
be expected to be beneficial for the productivity of land, and that, for the land revenue 
and cesses. When an “area approach” which tries to capture the effect of geographical 
differences between coastal areas and mountainous areas among others (like in Roy, T. 
(2014)) is made using provincial dummy variables (Table 5.3), there appears to be a 
certain provincial effect in the public health (medical) expenditure.  
It is hard to know with precision what drives this provincial effect. However, it can be 
said that, although when introduced in a model without more variables, provinces seem 
to play a role in public health provision, this role disappears once the settlement type, 
the land revenue system and other variables (see Table 5.4) are taken into account. 
Hence, it could be said that public health expenditure differences were present among 
provinces and the effect of institutional and geographical variables appears to be (at 
least partially) driving this provincial effect. Generally speaking, the type of settlement, 
the land revenue system and the geographical characteristics were more or less 
common among all the districts within a province. To corroborate this last statement, 
the coefficient of variation (CV) has been calculated for the land revenue system variable 
(inter), the type of settlement variable (settl) and the average rainfall variable (rain) for 
observations within each province. As is shown in Table 6.1, the CV for the different 
variables (especially for the type of settlement (settl)) is relatively low. This low 
                                                          
42 This effect is shown nowadays in Baru, R. et al (2010: 50-51). 
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variability within provinces regarding institutional and geographical variables might 
reinforce the idea that those variables explain a certain provincial effect on the public 
health provision. 
Table 6.1. Coefficients of variation (CV) for the variables inter settl and rain within each 
province. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Finally, the famine influence on the public health (medical) expenditure appears to be 
modest. Also, those districts with more famine years apparently had lower public health 
expenditures. This last statement could reinforce the hypothesis presented in Section III 
that the low investment in public health in certain districts might have allowed for more 
famine years. It could also be the case that, famine years lowered the collection of land 
revenue (and cesses), leading to a lower expenditure on public goods (including public 
health). However, it must be said that more evidence would be needed in order to 
assure the last two statements without hesitation. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
At the beginning of this work it was emphasised that the differences regarding public 
health (medical) expenditure in the British India of the early 20th Century were 
significant. The processes of decentralization during Lord Mayo’s and Lord Ripon’s 
viceroyalties allowed local governments, especially in the rural areas (district boards) 
where more than 90% of the population lived, to obtain resources and spend them in 
the provision of public goods such as healthcare.  
In order to explain the differences among districts regarding the public health 
expenditure, the present investigation has taken into account several potential 
explanatory factors: Some institutional (the land revenue systems, the type of 
settlement or the caste system) and some which were related to geography or regional 
Province Bengal Bombay 
Central 
Provinces 
Madras Punjab Agra 
CV (inter) 0 2,06873 0,08979 1,18741 0 0 
CV (settl) 2,23140 0 0 0 0 0,42916 
CV (rain) 0,32712 0,69854 0,14674 0,69168 0,56197 0,34517 
42 
 
particularities. Broadly, those districts with a Ryotwari system temporary settled 
seemed to present larger medical expenditures due to the larger revenue provided by 
those two institutions. Hence, the land revenue system and the type of settlement seem 
to have played an important role determining the differences in public health provision. 
Those districts without land revenue systems with intermediaries and temporary settled 
seem to have larger public health provision, as posited in Section III. On the other hand, 
the average rainfall and the number of famines from 1804 to 1904 seem to have a 
certain influence on the public health, but overall, a minor one. Regarding a potential 
provincial effect on public health, there appears to be significant differences between 
provinces regarding the public health expenditure. However, those differences seem to 
be, at least partially, determined by both, geographical and institutional factors 
characterizing the provinces. 
There might be different mechanisms explaining the influence of institutions over the 
public health expenditure at the district board’s level. This work signals mainly at one 
mechanism: The effect of land revenue systems and types of settlement on the tax rate 
and tax base of the cesses respectively, but it recognizes that there might be another 
mechanism explaining these effects. This last one, would imply the effect of land 
revenue systems and types of settlement on the land revenue and the provision of 
grants to district boards. In this work the previous mechanism could not be 
differentiated from the former, hence, the last one cannot be discarded. 
The relevance of institutions explaining the differences in public health expenditure 
emphasises even more the relevance of the influence of the subcontinent’s traditions 
and the British colonial rule over them. Thus, this work had no aim to precisely explain 
the origins and influences of the land revenue systems and the castes, but it definitely 
gave some clues on the importance of this topic over the role of institutions explaining 
the public goods provision. The intensity of each institution defining the public health 
expenditure patterns (and, potentially, in other public goods) might provide some 
evidence in the origin and influences of each institution. 
Finally, this investigation might motivate future investigation on this topic. In this regard, 
it would be interesting to clearly be able to differentiate the two mechanisms previously 
presented (grants and cesses) through which the land revenue systems and the type of 
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settlement could have influenced the expenditure in public health at the district level in 
order to quantify its importance. Another interesting topic would be to identify, with 
more depth than in the present study, if there is any change on the influence each 
institution has on public goods depending on its origins and influences (either from the 
colonial power (Britain) or from the ancient traditions of the subcontinent). Also, it 
would be interesting that future investigations use data on other medical expenditure 
than that on hospitals and dispensaries. 
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